WINE 2015 Accepted Papers

(in the order they were submitted)

• Oren Ben-Zwi, Monika Henzinger and Veronika Loitzenbauer.
  Ad Exchange: Envy-free Auctions with Mediators

• Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters.
  Choosing k from m: feasible elimination procedures reconsidered

• Matt Leduc and Ruslan Momot.
  Strategic Investment in Protection in Networked Systems

• Tobias Harks, Max Klimm and Manuel Schneider.
  Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands

• Stefano Turchetta and Paul Goldberg.
  Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games

• Nick Arnosti, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier.
  The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments

• Herve Moulin.
  One dimensional mechanism design

• Richard Cole and Shravas Rao.
  Applications of \alpha-strongly regular distributions to Bayesian auctions

• Shant Boodaghians and Adrian Vetta.
  Testing Consumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs

• Davide Crapis, Bar Ifrach, Costis Maglaras and Marco Scarsini.
  Monopoly Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning

• Vittorio Bilo' and Cosimo Vinci.
  On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games

• Vittorio Bilo', Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco and Luca Moscardelli.
  Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing Cost Functions

• Zeinab Abbassi, Nima Haghpanah and Vahab Mirrokni.
  Exchange Market Mechanisms without Money

• Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Omri Weinstein.
  Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium

• Rachel Cummings, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth and Zhiwei Steven Wu.
  Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games

• Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar.
  Price Competition in Networked Markets: How do monopolies impact social welfare?

• Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li and Rakesh Vohra.
  Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction

• Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar.
  Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing

• José Correa, Marcos Kiwi, Neil Olver and Alberto Vera.
  Adaptive Rumor Spreading

• Li Han, David Kempe and Ruixin Qiang.
  Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money

• Liad Blumrosen and Osnat Zohar.
  Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms

• Joosung Lee.
  Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies

• Dimitris Fotakis, Dimitris Kalimeris and Thanasis Lianeas.
  Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players

• Britta Dorn, Dominikus Krüger and Patrick Scharpfenecker.
  Often harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets

• José Correa, Jasper de Jong, Bart de Keijzer and Marc Uetz.
  The curse of sequentiality in routing games

• Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour and Liu Yang.
  Online Allocation and Pricing with Economies of Scale

• Antje Bjelde, Felix Fischer and Max Klimm.
  Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices

• Volodymyr Kuleshov and Okke Schrijvers.
  Inverse Game Theory: The Computational Complexity of Learning Utilities in Succinct Games

• Gerardo Berbeglia, Gautam Rayaprolu and Adrian Vetta.
  The Storable Good Monopoly Problem with Indivisible Demand

• Yun Kuen Cheung, Monika Henzinger, Martin Hoefer and Martin Starnberger.
  Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities

• Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart De Keijzer and Stefano Leonardi.
  Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations

• Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli, Clemente Galdi and Giuseppe Persiano.
  Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks

• Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai and Adrian Vetta.
  Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction

• Annamaria Kovacs, Ulrich Meyer and Carmine Ventre.
  Mechanisms with Monitoring for truthful RAM allocation

• Branislav Bosansky, Simina Branzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen and Troels Bjerre Sorensen.
  Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

• Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Maria Kyropoulou.
  The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling

• Soumya Basu, Thanasis Lianeas and Evdokia Nikolova.
  New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem

• Oliver Hinder.
  The Stable Matching Linear Program and an Approximate Rural Hospital Theorem with Couples