Brinn Hekkelman (CWI Amsterdam)
Fair Mechanisms for Smart Grid Congestion Management
Abstract: With the transition to a more distributed and intermittent energy system centered around prosumers, local distribution grids are undergoing significant changes. One of the primary challenges for these local grids is maintaining grid stability, which requires constant balancing of supply and demand. Because local grids were not designed for distributed energy generation and large loads such as electric vehicle charging, their limited capacity is now leading to congestion. As a result, the consequences for supply-demand balancing and congestion management are falling increasingly with the individual prosumers. This immediately raises the question: how to fairly distribute these consequences? To this end we focus on supply-demand matching mechanisms for fair congestion management. We represent the local networks, populated with prosumers, by radial multi-agent commodity flow systems. Given agents’ desired prosumptions, we then compute congestion solutions for the local network based on different notions of fairness. We provide corresponding algorithmic mechanisms to compute the fair solutions, and rigorously prove some additional properties of these mechanisms such as individual rationality and incentive compatibility. We find that notions of fairness regarding congested commodity flow networks can either focus on local or global fairness, and that the network topology plays an important role. Furthermore, we find that the mix of producers and consumers (prosumers) requires slight adaptation of notions of fairness, with agents envying one group while welcoming the other. Finally, we find that it is possible to combine notions of fairness with welfare optimization in a congestion aftermarket. We let individual agents decide which of the two is more important and protect their fair shares by making aftermarket participation optional.
Merlinda Andoni (University of Glasgow)
Strategic decision-making on low-carbon technology and network capacity investments using game theory
Abstract: Rapid adoption of renewable technologies has in many areas led to undesired curtailment. This means that not only renewable production is wasted, but often curtailment comes with high costs for renewable energy developers and energy end-users. A long-term solution to dealing with curtailment is increasing the network capacity. However, grid upgrades can be costly leading to a need for attracting private investment in network reinforcement. In this work, we design and evaluate a game-theoretic framework to study strategic interactions between private profit-maximising players that invest in network, renewable generation and storage capacity. Specifically, we study the case where grid capacity is developed by a private renewable investor, but line access is shared with competing renewable and storage investors, thus enabling them to export energy and access electricity demand. A practical demonstration of the underlying methodology is shown for a real-world grid reinforcement project in the UK. The methodology provides a realistic mechanism to analyse investor decision-making and investigate feasible tariffs that encourage distributed renewable investment, with sharing of grid access.
Sergio Grammatico (Delft University of Technology)
Game-Theoretic Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading in Distribution Grids
Abstract: In future distribution grids, prosumers (i.e., energy consumers with storage and/or production capabilities) will trade energy with each other and with the main grid. To ensure an efficient and safe operation of energy trading, in this paper, we formulate a peer-to-peer energy market of prosumers as a generalized aggregative game, in which a network operator is only responsible for the operational constraints of the system. We design a distributed market-clearing mechanism with convergence guarantee to an economically-efficient and operationally-safe configuration (i.e., a variational generalized Nash equilibrium). Numerical studies on the IEEE 37-bus testcase show the scalability of the proposed approach and suggest that active participation in the market is beneficial for both prosumers and the network operator.
Weiqi Hua (University of Oxford)
Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading: Barriers and Opportunities
Abstract: Electric power systems are transitioning towards a decentralised paradigm with the engagement of active prosumers (both producers and consumers) through using distributed multi-energy sources e.g., roof-top solar panels and electrified heating sources. Accommodating the new role of prosumers requires a flexible structure of local energy markets. The innovation of peer-to-peer energy trading enables prosumers to directly exchange energy in local markets for the energy bill saving, local energy balance, and grid resilience. This speak will analyse the barriers and opportunities of the peer-to-peer energy trading from the perspectives of regulators, power system operators, market operators, communities, individual prosumers, and enabling technologies. Potential implementations of the peer-to-peer energy trading will be instantiated by two studies in addressing the research questions of: 1) How to couple local energy markets and carbon markets through exploiting the peer-to-peer energy trading in achieving the net-zero energy transition; 2) How to use the peer-to-peer energy trading to unlock the flexibility provision from heating systems.
Speaker Bio: Weiqi Hua is a postdoc researcher in the Department of Engineering Science at the University of Oxford, UK. He received his PhD and Master degrees at the University of Durham, UK, in 2020 and 2017, respectively, and then took the postdoctoral position at the Centre for Integrated Energy Generation and Supply (CIREGS), Cardiff University, UK, from 2020 to 2021. He was the visiting researcher to the Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), Greece, in 2019, and visiting researcher to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, China, in 2018 and 2019. His research interests include energy system modelling, renewable energy integration, energy policy and economics, machine learning for energy system analytics, and peer-to-peer energy trading.
Na Li (Harvard University)
Learning and control for residential demand response
Residential loads have great potential to enhance the efficiency and reliability of electricity systems via demand response (DR) programs. One major challenge in residential DR is to handle the unknown and uncertain customer behaviors, which are further influenced by time-varying environmental factors. In this talk, we present a set of learning and control methods for regulating loads in residential demand response (DR) by modeling it as a multi-period stochastic optimization problem. Machine learning techniques including both offline and online learning tools are employed to learn the unknown thermal dynamics model and customer opt-out behavior model, respectively. Based on the Thompson sampling framework, we propose an online DR control algorithm to learn customer behaviors and make real-time load control schemes. This algorithm considers the influence of various environmental factors on customer behaviors and is implemented in a distributed fashion to preserve the privacy of customers. This work is based on our collaboration with an industry IoT company, ThinkEco Inc. If time allows, we will briefly present some of our other projects on real-time learning in power systems.
Joint work with Xin Chen, Yingying Li, Yutong Nie, Ran Qin, and Jun Shimada (Founder/CTO of ThinkEco Inc.
Speaker bio:
Na Li is a Gordon McKay professor in Electrical Engineering and Applied Mathematics at Harvard University. She received her Bachelor's degree in Mathematics from Zhejiang University in 2007 and a Ph.D. degree in Control and Dynamical systems from California Institute of Technology in 2013. She was a postdoctoral associate at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2013-2014. Her research lies in the control, learning, and optimization of networked systems, including theory development, algorithm design, and applications to real-world cyber-physical societal systems. She received NSF career award (2016), AFSOR Young Investigator Award (2017), ONR Young Investigator Award(2019), Donald P. Eckman Award (2019), McDonald Mentoring Award (2020), along with some other awards.
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